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abstract
three recent events affecting human rights in sexuality and reproduction (a 
proposed ban on abortion in Poland, blocking support for She Decides in Cro-
atia and halting a civil union law in estonia) were spearheaded by organizati-
ons which appear to be the national antennae of the transnational, socially con-
servative network called tradition, Family and Property (tFP). tFP refers to a 
set of interrelated conservative, Catholic-inspired organizations which share 
a common world view inspired by the tFP founder, Plinio Corrêa de oliveira. 
originating in Brazil in 1960 and eventually spreading throughout the world, 
tFP has long been an insurrection movement within Catholicism, with a dis-
tinct way of working by fusing social conservatism with economic hyper-libe-
ralism and a legacy of complicity with far-right movements. Having withered 
away from Latin america, tFP is now an active european network with posi-
tions against sexual and reproductive rights (Srr) among its priorities. tFP’s 
influence on Srr takes three main routes: social mobilization; norm entrepre-
neur and entering decision-making spaces. tFP has found new horizons in ea-
stern europe and ambitions to influence the european union and the united 
nations. the reactionary narrative of tFP espousing religious orthodoxy and 
sanctifying economic inequality could become attractive to some by offering 
religious legitimization for illiberalism and authoritarianism.





In the autumn of 2016, thousands of Polish women took to the streets in 
what became known as the ’Black Marches’ to protest a draft law which 
would seek to implement a total ban on abortion, removing the few 
allowable cases where it was legally available under Poland’s already restric-
tive law and even providing for the imprisonment of women who have an 
abortion (BBC 2016). In March 2017, the then Foreign affairs Minister of 
Croatia, decided to take a position against the She Decides global fundra-
ising initiative (Shedecides.com) on sexual and reproductive rights (Srr) 
and, further, to instruct Croatian diplomats to convince other european 
union (eu) Member States to take a similarly hostile position (despot, 
2017). earlier, in 2013, a petition gathering nearly 40,000 signatures in 
estonia against same-sex unions forced the parliament to temporarily halt 
its deliberations on its civil partnership legislation (White 2013b).
While the three political events share a similar socially conservative 
objective, they appear otherwise unrelated, as they appear at different 
times, in different national contexts and on different issues. Closer inspec-
tion of the main protagonists involved in each, however, reveals some hith-
erto unknown connections. In Poland, the organization most prominently 
involved in promoting the abortion ban was the Fondacija Instytut na 
rzecz Kultury Prawnej Ordo Iuris (Foundation Institute for Legal Culture 
’ordo Iuris’). Ordo Iuris drafted the legislation under consideration and 
both presented and defended it before parliament and to the public. In 
Croatia, individuals affiliated with the organization Vigilare gained privi-
leged access to the Minister for Foreign affairs to encourage him to adopt a 
more traditionalist perspective in Croatia’s diplomacy. In estonia, the initi-
ator and promoter of the petition which reached over 500,000 of estonia’s 
1.2 million citizens was the organization Sihtasutus Perekonna ja Tradit-
siooni Kaitseks (SPtK – Foundation for the Protection of Family and tradi-
tion). all three organizations, Ordo Juris, Vigilare and SPtK, appear to be 
the national antennae of the transnational, socially conservative, Catholic-
inspired lay organization called tradition, Family and Property (tFP). 
tFP refers to a set of interrelated conservative, Catholic-inspired lay 
organizations which share a world view inspired by the tFP founder, the 
20th century Brazilian landowner and politician, Plinio Corrêa de oliveira. 
tFP-related organizations go by the name tFP in their own country or by 
another name, often related to a socially conservative cultural cause. they 
number over 40 separate organizations across over dozens of countries and 
several continents. this article attempts to understand the extent of the 
tFP network in europe and how it works to influence sexual and repro-
ductive rights (Srr). 
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1. tFP origins and ideology
If the Revolution is disorder, the Counter-Revolution is the 
restoration of order. And by order we mean the peace of Christ 
in the Reign of Christ, that is, Christian civilization, austere 
and hierarchical, fundamentally sacral, anti-egalitarian, and 
anti-liberal.1 
Plinio Corrêa de oliveira, 
Revolução e Contra-Revolução, in Catolicismo, 
april 1959
Plinio Corrêa de oliveira (1908–1995) was a wealthy, conservative, Catholic 
landowner in Brazil who served in Brazil’s parliament and then went on 
to found tFP in 1960. a first characteristic of the movement is that tFP 
has a dual nature: spiritual and temporal. on the one hand, it can be seen 
as a similar conservative, religious movement to channel the motivation 
of lay Catholics as opus dei in Spain, Communion and Liberation in 
Italy and the Legion of Christ in Mexico, and, like these movements, tFP 
spread across the world from its native Brazil. on the other hand, tFP 
is also a politically active social movement focusing on the areas which 
Corrêa de oliveira identified as the two main enemies of the Church in 
the 1960s: from within the Church, the enemy was liberation theology 
and other ’modernist’ tendencies (which undermined the traditions of 
the Church) (Corrêa de oliveira 1974), and from outside the Church, it 
was Communism, which advocated for agrarian reform (posing a threat 
to large landowners) (Corrêa de oliveira 1985).
the doctrine of tFP is best described by its very name. By ’tradition’, 
tFP opposes socially progressive evolutions in Catholic teachings – for 
example, some of the reforms of vatican II – and advocates for the Church 
to remain true to its traditions in terms of social teachings and religious 
rites. While tFP opposes modernist tendencies in the Church and falls 
within the traditionalist faction of Catholic movements, it is not in open 
schism with rome, as some other groups are, such as the Society for Saint 
Pious X (SSPX).2 By tradition, tFP also supports the historical primacy of 
the Church over the secular State. By ’family’, tFP defends a traditionalist 
approach to marriage – namely, heterosexual, monogamous, patriarchal 
1  Corrêa de oliveira, Plinio. 1959 and 1977. “revolução e Contra-revolução”. Catolicismo, 
april 1959 (parts I and II) and january 1977 (part III): chapter III, part 1. 
2  the SSPX, also referred to as ’Lefebvrists’ after their founder, is a traditionalist Catholic 
movement which rejects the reforms of vatican II. the clergy associated with the SSPX were 
excommunicated in the 1980s and as such are considered ’out of communion’ with rome. 




and geared towards procreation. as such, it opposes the legalization of 
divorce, contraception and abortion as well as same-sex relations. While 
this is standard fare for conservative, religious movements, tFP’s posi-
tion on property is unique. In defending private property ownership, tFP 
specifically means inherited wealth and privileges; it opposes the notion 
of socio-economic equality, which it considers dangerously Communist. 
as such, unlike many other conservative Christian groups, tFP can be 
described as not believing in the modern welfare State nor in the redistri-
bution of wealth.
Corrêa de oliveira was a prolific author and expounded on his world 
vision in his many works.3 two works stand out: Revolution and Counter-
Revolution (Corrêa de oliveira 1959) and The Nobility and Analogous Tradi-
tional Elites (Corrêa de oliveira 1993). In Revolution and Counter-Revolu-
tion, Corrêa de oliveira explains how the current ills of the world are the 
result of three past revolutions – namely, the Protestant revolution of the 
16th century, which challenged the primacy of the Catholic Church; the 
French revolution of the 18th century, which ushered in the dangerous 
ideas of ’equality’ and ’liberty’ and undermined the privileges of the nobi-
lity; and the Communist revolutions of the 20th century, which endangered 
respect for private property itself and challenged the existence of God.
In Revolution and Counter-Revolution, Corrêa de oliveira explains how 
tFP will lead the counter-revolution, resulting in an apocalyptic battle of 
good versus evil which he calls the bagarre (the battle) to restore an ideal 
society based on how he imagined the world prior to these revolutions – 
namely, a society modelled on medieval europe. Harking back to an idea-
lized medieval past explains tFP’s extensive use of medieval imagery – for 
example, the heraldic ’lion rampant’ as its logo and the use of red capes and 
gold lion brooches as official dress for its members, who are themselves 
styled as ’warrior monks’, and large red flag-staffs and banners emblazoned 
with the tFP gold lion.4 
nostalgic fascination with an imagined medieval europe goes beyond 
inspiration for colourful imagery and branding, but forms the basis of 
tFP’s vision of an ideal social hierarchy. In The Nobility and Analogous 
Traditional Elites, tFP advocates for a return of the former aristocracy and 
analogous traditional elites (for example, large property owners in Latin 
america) to their historic and rightful positions of power. Indeed, invo-
king religious legitimacy for this position, according to the pontifical texts 
discussed hereafter, the nobility is an elite from every point of view. It is 
3  For Corrêa de oliveira’s many works, see: http://www.pliniocorreadeoliveira.info/livros.
asp.
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the highest elite, not the sole elite. It is a species within the genus ’elites’.5 
Such aristocrats would emerge after the bagarre to lead the world and thus 
save Western civilization by restoring authentic Christianity, all the while 
supported by the tFP warrior monks, while the rest of the population is 
reduced to a state of docile serfdom.
2. theoretical models for tFP
… it is difficult to understand how such a disjointed mixture of 
political reaction, religious intransigence and obscurantism 
could have flowered to the point that it enabled the TFP to 
reach out to the world, or at least to part of the Christian 
world of Western Europe, the United States and most of the 
countries of Latin America.6
tFP’s polymorph nature as both a religious and politically engaged social 
movement as well as a trans-national network spanning six decades requ-
ires a unique theoretical approach anchored in at least two models. the 
first concerns tFP’s religious personality as elaborated by Barker (2010), 
Compagnon (2008), Introvigne (2009), Mayer (1982), Matta (2008) and 
Zanotto (2017). the second field elucidate tFP development as a civil 
society movement as described by Power (2008), ruderer (2012), Peñas 
defago, et. al.(2018), Yamin, et. al. (2018), as well as Kuhar and Paternotte 
(2017).
eileen Barker’s work “the cult as a social problem” offers a theoretical 
framework for discussing new religious movements (nrM), often labelled 
as cults, and helps in understanding how tFP may be classified as nrM 
as a “religious or spiritual organisation with a predominantly first-genera-
tion membership.” Barker also identified some of the common questions 
which nrM’s must address including leadership, recruitment and ability 
to adapt. nrM’s often confront suspicion, at times justified and at time 
not, from society at large and from the hierarchy of the religion from which 
they derive which helps situate tFP’s standing within the wider Catholic 
world. Further, Matta (2008) explains in detail the case of the tFP in two 
Latin american countries and their specificity within the world of Catholic 
movements while Zanotto (2007) describes tFP as a ’complete organisa-
tion’ adequately filling the many varied needs of its adherents. 
However, Compagnon’s work on Catholic movements in the 20th century 
show how tFP is heir to an older tradition, that of Catholic fundamenta-
5  Ibid. 
6  Latin america report. 1985. “tFP Composition, Political orientation, training discussed”. 




lism. the concept of Catholic fundamentalism itself only becomes relevant 
when the mainstream of the Catholic world evolves to a new stage, leaving 
those who resisted in a minority position. tFP would thus be a nrM based 
on preserving Catholicism at a stage before its 20th century evolution. as 
such, Mayer’s work on the religious social movements helps situate tFP 
as an insurrection movement within Catholicism, specifically against the 
perceived progressivism of vatican II and liberation theology. However, 
tFP is not the only traditionalist Catholic movement with pre-conciliar 
positions and Introvigne’s analysis from a religious economy perspective 
on how different religious movements position themselves internally and 
with the externally explains tFP’s evolution over time and its near schism 
with the Catholic hierarchy.
In addition to being a religious movement, tFP has equally been a 
politically active, trans-national social movement. Margaret Power (2010) 
explains the important role tFP played in the global fight against abor-
tion and Communism from the 1960s to the 1980s. Stephan ruderer (2012) 
analysed tFP’s role as a standard bearer for Catholic fundamentalism tran-
slating into a synergistic relationship with the authoritarian regimes of 
Pinochet’s Chile and videla’s argentina (ruderer 2012). Finally, Peñas 
defago’s, et. al (2018) conceptualization of the modernisation of conser-
vative social movements in the early 21st century combined with Paternotte 
and Kuhar’s (2017) analysis of anti-gender movements shed light on tFP 
affiliates’ influence on Srr today. 
on this basis, this article seeks to understand two phenomena: first, 
the development of tFP in europe; and second, tFP’s ability to organize 
and impact issues which are among its priorities, specifically Srr. this 
article does not explore the religious beliefs and practices within the tFP 
network. 
3. Spread, growth and division of tFP
Based on such powerful ideals and a charismatic leader, the tFP network 
grew to comprise over 40 organizations spread across several continents. 
the tFP network became what it is today over the course of four distinct 
phases: the first being from the foundation in 1960 to the early 1990s; the 
second precipitated by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; the third precipi-
tated by the founder’s death in 1995 and finally the fourth from the conclu-
sion of the legal challenges to the present.7
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3.1. the First Phase: foundation and expansion
In 1968, the TFPs then existing in South America… organized 
national petition drives addressed to Paul VI, requesting 
measures against leftist infiltration into the Catholic clergy 
and laity of South America. Altogether, 2,060,368 people in 
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay signed the petition 
during a 58-day period. (Corrêa de oliveira 1959, 97)
From its origins in Brazil in 1960, tFP then spreads first to other Latin 
american countries by founding local non-governmental organisations 
where the climate created by authoritarian military regimes provided fertile 
ground (ruderer 2012). the founder and a close circle of confidants drawn 
from the other initial founders tightly controlled this expansion and the 
founder himself personally chose the names of the organizations in each 
country (Matta 2008). In the early 1970s, tFP appeared in France (tfp-
france.org) where it settled in a château in the region of Lorraine8 from 
where it spread to other european countries.9 at the same time, outposts 
appeared in Canada, South africa, the uSa and australia.10 
In this period tFP’s primary targets were Communism and Liberation 
theology, the two forces joining to promote agrarian reforms which threa-
tened the interests of its land owning founding members. Margaret Power 
(2010) and Gonzalez ruiz (2006) describe tFP’s role in socially conserva-
tive movements in Latin america where tFP developed their signature 
public campaigns which combine displays of religious expression with poli-
tical actions. an early attempt to root out liberal tendencies inside the 
Church took place in Chile, with the tFP affiliate Fiducia publishing a scat-
hing criticism of the Chilean Catholic Church in 197611 where it accused 
the Chilean Bishops of having acted in complicity with the leftist/Marxist 
Frei and allende governments to carry out socialist reforms.
Similar pressure was exerted in europe, for example in 1981 in France 
with an open letter about the ills of the Socialist government of François 
8  Fédération Pro-europa Christiana – Creutzwald (Fpec-creutzwald.org).
9  deutsche Gesellschaft zum Schutz von tradition, Familie und Privateigentum e.v. (tfp-
deutschland.de); L’associazione tradizione Famiglia Proprietà (atfp.it); acção Família (acca-
ofamilia.eu); Irish Society for Christian Civilisation (Isfcc.org); and Österreichische Gesells-
chaft zum Schutz von tradition, Familie und Privateigentum (tfp.at).
10  Canadian Society for the defence of Christian Civilization (Canadaneedsourlady.org); 
the american Society for the defense of tradition, Family and Property (tfp.org), South afri-
cans for a Christian Civilization ceased functioning in the early 2000s; and australian tradi-
tion, Family and Property (tfp.org.au).





Mitterand entitled What Does Self-Managing Socialism Mean for Commu-
nism: A Barrier? Or a Bridgehead? (Corrêa de oliveira 1981). the letter was 
published in leading newspapers around the world, while tFP asserts it was 
able to mail it to 300,000 people in France .12 Building on this success, the 
Spanish tFP-Covadonga released España, anestesiada sin percibirlo, amor-
dazada sin quererlo, extraviada sin saberlo – La obra del PSOE (tFP Cova-
donga 1988) in 1988 on how the Socialist government of Félipé Gonzalez 
had betrayed Spain. 
In this first phase, tFP had become an influential, international, anti-
Communist movement as well as a successful traditionalist insurrec-
tion within Catholicism. However, it also started encountering the first 
instances of the two main challenges which would haunt it for decades: 
hostility from the Catholic hierarchy and legal difficulties arising from 
tFP’s alleged practices. 
3.2. the Second Phase:  
re-focus in a changing environment
a number of external factors provoked the tFP network to shift focus, 
thus entering a second phase in its existence. these include the fall of the 
Berlin Wall (signalling the demise of its greatest foe, Communism), the 
vatican’s formal condemnation of liberation theology and the presence 
of a sufficiently conservative Pope. as Barker describes, a characteristic of 
nrM’s is that “they are likely to change far more quickly and fundamentally 
than older, more traditional religions” and this is evidenced as tFP leaders 
worked to create new types of organizations focusing on social issues of 
the day, namely abortion and the related human rights on sexuality and 
reproduction. the anti-abortion organizations Droit de Naître in France 
and Generazione Voglio Vivere in Italy would appear in the early 1990s. this 
addition to the tFP template proved successful and spread to Germany, 
austria and Poland.13 another experiment was that of Luci sull’est in Italy, 
which focused on bringing the tFP message to previously formally atheist 
eastern europe. a successful early example which still generates pride in 
the tFP network is the mass petition supporting Lithuanian independence 
in 1990 which gathered the support of over 5 million people, earning it a 
place in the Guinness Book of World Records (Corrêa de oliveira 1991).
12  Ibid. 
13  aktion Kinder in Gefahr (KIG) (aktion-kig.de); SoS Leben (dvck-sosleben.de) and 
Prawo do narodzin (Prawodonarodzin.pl).
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3.3. the third Phase: legal challenges 
at the movement’s height, Corrêa de oliveira passed away in 1995, marking 
the beginning of the third and most troubled phase in the movement’s 
history which only ended in 2004. as often happens in movements built 
around the founder’s charisma and where large-scale finances are at stake, 
internal strife broke out between different tFP factions. the factions 
emerged around three main differences: 1) the use of the tFP brand; 
2) the future direction of tFP as a political campaigning organization; and 
3) the religious teachings of the organization. this led to legal action with 
a series of decisions from the Brazilian courts in 1997 and 2004 (IStoe 
2013; Bezzera 2013). 
the trial resulted in a victory (IStoe 2013; Bezzera 2013) for the faction 
which wished to mend fences with the Church and downplay the organi-
zation’s political engagement. external factors, including the presence of 
a conservative Pope, allowed the winners, led by a former lieutenant of 
Corrêa de oliveira,14 to pursue a different path – that of rapprochement 
with the vatican – by having the organization recognized as an Interna-
tional association of Pontifical right in 2001, known as the Heralds of the 
Gospel (Heraldsusa.org). the Heralds of the Gospel is thus the spiritual 
wing of the tFP movement, sharing many of the devotional traits of tFP 
as well as some of the visual branding in ceremonial clothing, but shedding 
the social and political activism which had characterized tFP’s temporal 
dimension. Most importantly, tFP transitioned from a near schismatic 
insurrection to a fully integrated Catholic movement.
While the Heralds retained the rights to the tFP brand in Latin america 
and Iberia, it does not actively use it, leading to the tFP organisations in 
those regions to gradually disappear. the losing side in Brazil founded 
the association of the Founders (Fundadores.org.br) and an online library 
dedicated to the founder’s writings (Pliniocorreadeoliveira.info). However, 
the tFP organisations in europe remained unaffected by the Brazilian 
verdict and continued their development, some growing to positions of 
influence in eastern europe, while the disappearance of tFP created space 
for a new socially conservative organisation to emerge in Spain.
3.4. the Fourth Phase: re-birth in europe
a fourth phase emerged in the early 21st century with a less centralized 
leadership, allowing for innovation. Most importantly, the centre of the 
movement would shift from Brazil to europe, first to France and later to 





Poland. From its French headquarters, tFP bought a building in Brussels 
in 2008 and opened a representation to the european union under the 
name Fédération Pro-europa Christiana (FPeC) (Fpec-bxl.be) and in 2011, 
its own academy at its Lorraine headquarters, the Institut européen de 
Sciences Sociales (IeSS) (Sciencessociales.fr). the tFP network developed 
rather quickly, with a flourishing infrastructure appearing in austria15 and 
Germany16 and Italy.17
the most recent tFP innovation has been to expand into litigation 
and policy development with the creation of Ordo Iuris in Poland in 2001. 
Ordo Iuris is the first experiment in developing legal and policy exper-
tise which has been active in ’law-fare’18 processes before the Polish courts 
and european Institutions.19 the Polish tFP organisations seem to have 
taken the leadership within the movement as they have expanded the 
franchise to Croatia20, estonia21, the netherlands22, Slovakia23 and Swit-
zerland.24 this new generation of tFP organisation takes to a higher level 
what had been signature tFP methodologies (see section 5) correspon-
ding to the professionalization of conservative actors (Peñas defago, et. 
al. 2018). these new tFP organisations have become key actors, at times 
15  Österreichische Gesellschaft zum Schutz von tradition, Familie und Privateigentum 
(tfp.at)
16  der adel (der-adel.info); deutschland braucht Mariens Hilfe (Mariens-hilfe.de); and 
deutsche Gesellschaft zum Schutz von tradition, Familie und Privateigentum e.v. (tfp-
deutschland.de); deutsche vereinigung für eine christliche Kultur (dvck.de) and https://
kultur-und-medien-online.blogspot.com/2011/03/deutsche-vereinigung-fur-eine.html.
17  associazione tradizione, Famiglia, Proprietà (atfp.it); Centro Studi Storici sulla Contro-
rivoluzione (CeSCor, Cescor.org); Corrispondenza romana (Corrispondenzaromana.it); La 
Famiglia domani (Famigliadomani.it); and the Lepanto Foundation (Fondazionelepanto.
org). 
18  “Lawfare” includes legal mobilization and litigation at national and international level 
(Yamin, datta and andion, 2018). 
19  For examples of ’lawfare’, see: http://www.ordoiuris.pl/interwencje-prawne, as of 10 
March 2019.
20  Centar za obnovu culture (Cok.hr); vigilare (vigilare.org); and tradFest (tradfest.
org).
21  Sihtasutus Perekonna ja Moraaliseaduse Kaitseks (association for the defence of Family 
and Morality (Saptk.ee)); elukultuuri Instituut (the Institute for Life Sciences): https://
elukultuur.wordpress.com; objektiiv.ee (SaPtK’s news and opinion portal) and abort.ee, 
as of 10 March 2019.
22  Stichting Civitas Christiana (’Cultuur onder vuur’ (Cultuurondervuur.nu)); Stirezo 
(Stichting recht Zonder onderscheid) Pro-Life (Stirezo.nl); and Gezin in Gevaar (Gezinin-
gevaar.nl).
23  nadácia Slovakia Christiana (Slovakiachristiana.sk); Fatima Slovensko (Fatimapres-
lovensko.sk) 
24  Helvetia Christiana (Helvetia-christiana.ch)
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leaders, in the anti-gender campaigns in europe which Kuhar and Pater-
notte (2017) describe. 
3.5. the Case of Spain
an interesting case is that of Spain. For nearly three decades, a succe-
ssful tFP organization thrived in Spain, the tFP-Sociedad Cultural Cova-
donga.25 tFP-Covadonga was a victim of the court case in Brazil and disa-
ppeared around 1999. However, in 2003 a new organization called Hazte 
oir appeared which seems to fit many of the characteristics often asso-
ciated with tFP (see section 5), including: grass-roots mobilization 
combined with fundraising, multiplicity of branding, youth outreach, 
the same uS contacts, intense contact with other tFP organizations and, 
finally, exercising traditionalist pressure on the Catholic Church. It diverges 
from tFP characteristics primarily in its branding, and, while Catholic 
inspired, Hazte oir is by no means a religious movement, and there are 
no references to Corrêa de oliveira. Hazte oir (literally, ’make yourself 
heard’) plays a watchdog role on Spanish political life and launched a social 
mobilization platform “CitizenGo” which would appear to be a 21st century 
digital version of the direct mailing techniques tFP pioneered in the 1970s 
(see section 8). Hazte oir may be the reincarnation of tFP-Covadonga 
under a new set of circumstances where there are limits as to how openly 
it may display its affiliations in Spain26 (see section 6). Whether Hazte oir 
is formally part of the tFP family or not, it shares many of the characteri-
stics of tFP organizations and occupies the same niche. 
3.6. tFP reach
taken together, tFP organizations exhibit diversity in size, reach and 
funding. the tFP umbrella organization, the FPeC, declares an average 
annual turnover of approximately €2 million to French authorities,27 origi-
nating from the membership fees across europe. these member organi-
sations in turn generate this revenue through their fundraising initiatives. 
25  For tFP’s presence in Spain, see: http://www.pliniocorreadeoliveira.info/GestaeS_
0211espana.htm#.WvIL7ovoKuk.
26  agente Provocador. 2017. “Los «caballeros medievales» de Covadonga son peores que 
Hazte oír.” Agente Provocador, 8 March. http://www.agenteprovocador.es/publicaciones/
hazte-oir-poda-ser-peor.
27  FPeC’s 2012 and 2017 annual accounts: association Pro europa Christiana. 2012. Rapport 
au Commissaire des Comptes sur les comptes annuels, exercice clos le 30 juin 2012 and FPeC’s 
2017 annual accounts: association Pro europa Christiana. 2017. Rapport au Commissaire des 




FPeC also owns several real estate properties in France and in Brussels.28 
However, other tFP affiliates are more modest; some may not even be 
registered officially and are only informal associations of individuals with 
a light web presence.29 tFP individual members are not likely to number 
more than a few hundred individuals per country and have traditionally 
been all-male.30 However, their small size in personal affiliation is compen-
sated for by their public outreach, which can reach several hundreds of 
thousands of people, depending on the country. 
From these small number of adherents, tFP leverages influence in two 
ways: first, by attracting ’elites’ with a specific background. the place of 
honour reserved for aristocrats attracted a number of noble families to 
become supporters – for example, the tFP representative to the eu is Paul, 
duke of oldenburg31 (a grandson of the last German emperor), or the late 
Luigi, Marquis of naples, who is described as “a personal friend of Prof. 
Plinio Corrêa de oliveira’s” (nobility.org 2015). Specifically, tFP favours 
a return to power of the former Brazilian imperial family, the family of 
orléans-Bragança, who feature prominently at tFP events.32 Indeed, tFP 
is the clerico-aristocratic network par excellence which Kemper describes33 
in the landscape of anti-gender actors. Second, the mainstay of the tFP 
leadership in europe to this day are Latin american men and returnee 
émigrés who took Corrêa de oliveira’s message from its native Brazil and 
spread it across the europe.34
28  these properties are La Villa Clairière in Creutzwald, the Le Jaglu château in Château-
neuf-en-thymerais and a townhouse on rue taciturne in Brussels. 
29  tFP Malta https://www.facebook.com/pg/ProMaltaChristiana/about/ retrieved 17 
March 2019
30  Introvigne (2009) and assemblée nationale. 1995. Rapport fait au nom de la Commi-
ssion d’enquête sur les sectes, Rapporteur M. Jacques Guyard, 20 décembre 1995. Paris: assem-
blée nationale which categorized the French tFP organizations among those with between 
50 and 500 members.
31  FPeC (Fpec-bxl.be) and european Parliament transparency register entry on FPeC as 
of 19 March 2017: http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylob-
byist.do?id=65395896737-91
32  See the programmes of Summer academies and Chivalry Camps listed above.
33  Kemper, andreas. 2015. “Christlicher Fundamentalismus und neoliberal-nationalkon-
servative Ideologie am Beispiel der ’alternative für deutschland’. in “unheilige allianz das 
Geflecht von christlichen Fundamentalisten und politisch rechten am Beispiel des Wider-
stands gegen den Bildungsplan in Baden-Württemberg Ideologie am Beispiel der ’alterna-
tive für deutschland’”, edited by Lucie Billmann, rosa Luxembourg Stiftung.
34  among the Latin american men are Caius vidigal Xavier da Silva, nelson Fraginelli 
and josé ureta. examples of returnee émigrés include Matthias von Gersdoff (born in Chile 
and founding the German tFP), Carlos eduardo Schaffer (born in Brazil and founding the 
austrian tFP) and Leonardo Prybysz (born in Brazil and founding the Polish tFP).
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4. Shared tFP traits
Gizele Zanotto (2007) characterises tFP as a ’chameleon’ being able to take 
on different shapes and colours to suit its changing surroundings. However, 
the tFP chameleon comes only in a limited range of shapes which are reco-
gnizable as: 1) tFP organizations; 2) cultural organizations;35 3) anti-abor-
tion organizations;36 4) organizations dedicated to Mary or Fatima;37 and 
5) legal organizations named ordo Iuris.38 the fact that they are part of 
the tFP network is evidenced by their mutually referencing each other 
as part of the same network; that the same individuals involved in tFP 
organizations are also involved in these other organizations; and their 
use of tFP branding. despite their brand multiplicity, key traits of tFP 
affiliates include: shared leadership; iconography and branding; youth 
outreach; fundraising techniques; transnational links outside the tFP 
family; a specific focus for religious veneration; and links with far-right 
movements. 
tFP organizations share the same leadership which tend to be led by 
a small cadre of men, usually of Latin american origin as well as euro-
pean aristocrats. these men exchange roles in different tFP-related orga-
nizations, for example, one individual will be president of organization X, 
board member of organization Y and a staff member of organization Z. 
this is done within countries and transnationally. In short, the leadership 
of the many tFP-associated organizations around the world is held by a 
small and interchangeable cadre of men.39 
another common feature is tFP’s unique iconography, drawing on a 
medieval crusader motif. aside from the ’lion rampant’ visual for some tFP 
organizations’ logos, others which do not bear the tFP name do make use 
35  Fédération Pro-europa Christiana (Federation-pro-europa-christiana.org); and for 
France: avenir de la Culture (avenirdelaculture.org); and for Germany: deutsche vereini-
gung für eine christliche Kultur (dvck.de).
36  See for France droit de naître (droitdenaitre.org); for Italy Generazione voglio vivere 
(Generazionevogliovivere.it); for Poland Prawo do narodzin (prawodonarodzin.pl)
37  South africa needs our Lady (Sanol.co.za); and america needs Fatima (americaneeds-
fatima.org). 
38  See for Poland ordo Iuris – Instytut na rzecz Kultury Prawnej (ordoiuris.pl)
39  For example, nelson Fraginelli is involved in the tFP organizations in Brazil, France, 
Italy and the uSa; Paul, duke of oldenburg, heads the tFP office in Brussels and is on the 
boards of the tFP organizations in Canada and estonia. also on the board of the estonian 
tFP is Sławomir olejniczak, who is on the Polish and Croatian tFP’s boards. valdis Grinsteins 
serves on the estonian and uS tFP’s boards. the Canadian tFP board assembles individ-
uals from tFP organizations from across the world, such as Georges Martin from the French 
tFP affiliate, jose antonio ureta from the Chilean tFP member, who also helped establish 
the South african tFP, and Carlos eduardo Schaffer, who was also active in tFP Brazil and a 




of the logo – for example, vigilare in Croatia and ordo Iuris in Poland.40 In 
addition, the Crusader motif is regularly used by tFP affiliates,41 and the 
founder himself is styled as a crusader.42 related to this is the use of histo-
rical personalities or important Christian victories in the names of tFP 
organizations.43 a number of tFP events are in fact celebrations of medi-
eval imagery, such as tradFest, “a festival of tradition and conservative 
ideas”, which takes place in Croatia since 2016.44
the medieval imagery infuses tFP work in another area: that of youth 
outreach. Several tFP organizations run summer schools for young 
people, mainly adolescent boys and young men. tFP affiliates call the 
youth camps Summer academies in austria, Germany and Poland and 
Chivalry Camps in Ireland and the uSa.45 tFP characteristics are on display 
at these youth camps – for example, the medieval imagery, complete with 
“parades of manly chivalry”, the involvement of aristocrats and readings 
from the works of the founder and tFP religious ceremonies.46 this has 
most recently coalesced into creating tFP Student action europe in 2017 
which mobilizes these same young men into street protests.47 While the 
youth activities target adolescent boys and young men, the tFP network 
expanded to post-secondary education by opening the Institute d’etudes 
sur les Sciences Sociales (IeSS). the IeSS faculty and board are composed 
of the same personalities who make up the leadership of tFP organiza-
tions, as well as their wives.48 the courses the IeSS offers are aimed at 
40  vigilare displays the tFP lion on Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/vigilare) but 
not its website (vigilare.org), and ordo Iuris displays the tFP lion’s head (ordoiuris.pl).
41  Krucjata Młodych (Youth Crusade) in Poland (Krucjata.org.pl). 
42  de Mattei, roberto. 1996. El Cruzado del Siglo XX. asociación tradición y acción por 
un Perú Mayor.
43  For example, Piotr Skarga, from which the Polish tFP organization takes its name, was 
a famous 16th century Polish jesuit who was active in the Counter-reformation by being crit-
ical of religious tolerance and advocating for monarchical powers.
44  tradfest (tradfest.org).
45  For Summer academies in europe, see http://tfp.at/2007/07/31/lernen-um-den-stuermen-
der-geschichte-zu-trotzen-sommerakademie-2007 and http://tfp-france.org/28501/universite-
dete-2017-des-tfp-en-europe, for the Summer university of tFP in niepołomice, Poland see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPf6eKfmfZs and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-
lQpL5h99s); and for Chivalry Camps in Ireland, see https://www.isfcc.org/summer-camps and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBdIuja5LcI&feature=autoshare; and https://www.tfps-
tudentaction.org/get-involved/call-to-chivalry-camps/tfp-chivalry-camp-in-the-shadow-of-
the-sequoias in the uSa, as of 10 March 2019. 
46  See the programmes of Summer academies and Chivalry Camps listed above. 
47  https://tfpstudentactioneurope.org/ as of 11 March 2019.
48  http://www.sciencessociales.fr, where edyta olejniczak, the spouse of Sławomir 
olejniczak (Polish and Croatian tFP), as well as Catherine rochet-Goyard, the spouse of 
jean Goyard (French tFP), Maria del Pilar, duchess of oldenburg, the spouse of Paul, duke 
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’leading a profound reflection on European culture with an emphasis on its 
Christian roots and thus responding to Pope Jean Paul II’s call for an evan-
gelization of culture’.49 
despite its elite origins and governance, tFP organizations specialize 
in grass-roots mobilization. tFP organizations excel at mass mailings, 
public campaigns and protests (see section 8.1). a number have even deve-
loped their own media ranging from magazines/reviews to news agencies 
and even television channels.50 this grass-roots outreach helps them in 
another area: fundraising. tFP’s fundraising toolkit includes requesting 
funds for campaigns; often several campaigns take place at the same time. 
Carlos eduardo Schaffer, who was involved in several tFP organizations, 
is credited with having developed the system of direct mail and fundrai-
sing for the organization through personal visits …. [and] is now develo-
ping a system of fundraising through mass e-mails in combination with a 
call center.51 the tFP model of direct mail fundraising was described by a 
French inter-ministerial body in 2006 (MIvILudeS 2006) as comprising 
four distinct phases: 1) prospecting potential donors; 2) direct mailing to 
their homes; 3) sharing a database of contacts with other organizations 
within the tFP network; and 4) home visits to request regular, monthly 
contributions. this 2006 report notes that the fundraising campaigns are 
often an end in themselves, as no funds collected will be spent to address 
the issue identified, except to fundraise for the campaign itself (Ibid).
another characteristic which tFP affiliates share is their transnational 
partnership with an actor in the uSa, the Leadership Institute (LI).52 the LI 
describes itself as teaching conservatives of all ages how to succeed in poli-
tics, government, and the media.53 Gordon Blackwell, an influential voice 
of the uS Christian right and founder of the LI, praises tFP, stating … 
Intensely Catholic, their members receive Communion every day. Although 
a secular group, in some ways they could be likened to a medieval religious 
order. They stand opposed to much that has occurred in modern times, 
which they consider to have commenced at the end of the Middle Ages, a 
not unreasonable view. They intend to save Western civilization or to die 
of oldenburg (FPeC), Mme Heleen Bos-Boerefyn, the spouse of Hugo Bos (dutch tFP) are 
listed as faculty and board members, as of 10 March 2019.
49  From http://www.sciencessociales.fr/institut/cours.
50  Correspondance européenne (Correspondanceeuropeenne.eu); Corrispondenza romana 
(Corrispondenzaromana.it); Polonia Cristiana24 (Pch24.pl); of the estonian SatPK (objek-
tiiv.ee)and radici Cristiane (radicicristiane.it) (access 10. 3. 2019).







trying. Since my visit to Brazil, I have taken opportunities to meet nati-
onal TFP leaders in my travels to half a dozen countries on four continents 
(Blackwell 2010). tFP organizations and LI collaborate on a range of trai-
ning events in europe, with workshops focusing on fundraising, lobbying 
and advocacy.54 a deeper relationship exists whereby the leadership of tFP 
organizations (the same cadre of men mentioned above) are also visiting 
professors for the LI.55
tFP is also a religious movement and as such focuses on certain aspects 
of the Catholic religion – specifically, the veneration of the virgin Mary 
and secrets of Fatima56 which play prominent roles in tFP public and 
private ceremonies. dedicated websites to Fatima operated by tFP exist 
in nearly all countries where tFP has a presence.57 tFP combines its reli-
gious devotion with its fundraising outreach by selling the books written 
by the founder58 and religious items, such as a ’miraculous medal’ featu-
ring a Catholic motif.59 
a final characteristic of the tFP movement is its proximity to elements 
of the far-right, specifically of the older fascist traditions in europe and 
Latin america. tFP affiliates in France are close to fascist political parties 
(Compagnon, 2008), with the Italian tFP members described as being 
“parts of a galaxy of traditionalist and Far-right movements”.60 Conver-
sely, tFP activities attract persons involved in far-right parties, for example 
54  Leadership Institute training programmes for Madrid (2009) and London (2010, 2011).
55  tFP personalities referred to as having a function at LI: 
Carlos eduardo Schaffer: https://leadershipinstitute.org/training/contact.cfm? Facul-
tyId=679589; 
josé ureta: http://www.leadershipinstitute.org/training/contact.cfm?FacultyId=144665; 
Silvio dalla valle: https://www.leadershipinstitute.org/training/contact.cfm? Facul-
tyId=144662; 
Sławomir olejniczak: http://www.leadershipinstitute.org/training/contact.cfm?Faculty 
Id=139901; and Matthias von Gersdorff: https://www.leadershipinstitute.org/training/contact.
cfm?FacultyId=144668, as of 10 March 2019.
56  Bertone, tarcisio, SdB, archbishop emeritus of vercelli, Secretary of the Congregation 
for the doctrine of the Faith. 2000. “Congregation for the doctrine of the Faith: the Message 
of Fatima.” La Santa Sede website: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/
documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000626_message-fatima_en.html.
57  examples include in austria (Fatimaonline.at); Canada (Canadaneedsourlady.org); 
Germany (Mariens-hilfe.de and Fatima-familie.de); Peru (Fatima.org.pe); Poland (Przymi-
erzezmaryja.pl); South africa (Sanol.co.za); and the uSa (americaneedsfatima.org). (access 
10.1.2019).
58  to purchase the works of tFP, see: http://store.tfp.org/ and http://www.ksiegarnia.polo-
niachristiana.pl/, as of 10 March 2019.
59  http://www.die-wundertaetige-medaille.de; and http://medaglia-miracolosa.it (access 
10. 3. 2019).
60  Garbagnoli, Sara. 2017. “Italy as a lighthouse; anti-gender protests between the ’anthro-
pological question’ and national identity.” In Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe, edited by 
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the rising star of the Belgian vlams Belang who participated in the tFP 
summer academy in Poland (Cochez 2019). In some cases, the relations 
between tFP leaders and fascism are personal (Piątek 2017c). In Spain, the 
tFP-Covadonga was historically close to the Franco regime,61 and in Latin 
america, national tFP affiliates maintained close links with the various 
military dictatorships from the 1970s onwards ruderer 2012). the relati-
onship was mutually reinforcing, with tFP providing a moral ’truth’ for 
the exercise of power by such forces. ruderer (2012) explains all these are 
concepts that dictatorships used to legitimize violence, were found in the 
texts of the TFP already in the 60s (translated from Spanish n.d.).62 
5. relations with the Catholic Church 
tFP’s relationship with the Catholic Church needs to be situated within 
the context of the emergence of various streams of 20th century Catholic 
thinking and movements. Compagnon (2008) recalls how there were three 
broad movements within the Catholic world starting in the late 1950s. 
the first was the liberation theology which advocated for a Catholicism 
better adapted to the developing world by addressing inequalities. the 
second Christian democracy, which sought to bring the social doctrine of 
the Church into politics, resulting in a number of Christian democratic 
parties across europe and Latin america. the third current was that of 
Catholic fundamentalism, of which the Brazilian tFP was among the first 
representatives. (Compagnon 2008)
tFP was founded at a time when the Church was undergoing great 
turmoil with various competing currents pulling in different directions. 
the founder is reported to have attended the Second vatican Council but 
left early, as he was unhappy with the liberal, progressive wind sweeping 
the delegates.63 For Corrêa de oliveira, there were two great enemies he 
must confront: Communism was the primary external enemy, while libe-
ration theology was the main enemy within. as such, tFP is what Mayer 
(1982) in his political-economy approach to religious movements, would 
refer to as an insurrection within Catholicism, at times bordering on a 
schism. as Mayer explained, such insurrection movements understand 
their relative autonomy/vulnerability towards the official hierarchy and 
which explains why tFP entities are not constituted as Catholic entities; 
roman Kuhar and david Paternotte, Chapter 9. Lanham, Md: rowman and Littlefield Inter-
national.
61  agente Provocador. 2017.
62  Ibid.





rather, they are legally constituted as civil organizations according to the 
laws of the countries where they are based (Matta, 2008).
a serious degradation of relations occurred in the 1980s when national 
Conference of Bishops of Brazil (nCBB) accused tFP of straying away from 
the teachings of the Church. In 1985, the nCBB wrote a letter decrying 
tFP’s alleged apostasy – namely, Its esoteric character, the religious fana-
ticism, the cult given to the personality of its leader and his mother, the 
abusive use of the name of Mary Most Holy, according to news items circu-
lated, cannot in any way merit the approval of the Church.64 as a result, 
Corrêa de Oliveira’s TFP was explicitly disavowed by the bishops. (Intro-
vigne 2009) Because of this, some even questioned tFP’s authenticity as 
a Catholic movement, instead dubbing it ’pseudo-Catholic’.65 Critics also 
came from within. orlando Fedeli, one of the founding members of tFP, 
described the movement as having degenerated into a ’burlesque gnosis’ 
(Fedeli 2010). at one point, Oliveira had gone down, with these criticisms, 
a path openly schismatic, of separation from the Church. (Cariello 2008) 
Since the death of the founder and the courts in Brazil issued their 
verdict, relations between the tFP family and the Catholic Church have 
improved. the religious wing of tFP is now its own International associ-
ation of Pontifical right known as the Heralds of the Gospel. as the reli-
gious aspects of tFP went with the Heralds, the more eccentric devotional 
ceremonies of the past no longer posed an obstacle. this resulted in greater 
but not complete acceptance of tFP organizations within the wider world 
of Catholic laity until recently. (Introvigne 2009) at the same time, under 
Pope Benedict, the Church was sufficiently conservative so as to no longer 
warrant an internal insurrection. 
However, the arrival of Pope Frances, often seen as a liberal and moder-
niser, has awoken the need for conservative pressure. thus, tFP attempted 
to exert pressure to prevent reforms with its Declaration of Fidelity to the 
Church’s Unchangeable Teachings on Marriage and to her Uninterrupted 
Discipline,66 signed by many tFP members as well as the aristocrats the 
network attracts in advance of the extraordinary Synod on the Family in 
2015.67 Similarly, in 2017, a group including roberto de Mattei of the Italian 
tFP signed A Filial Correction Concerning the Propagation of Heresies, also 
64  tFP. 2007. “the american tFP’s 2007 comments regarding a note on the Brazilian tFP 
approved by the national Conference of Bishops of Brazil on april 19, 1985.” tFP website. 
http://www.tfp.org/ref/ncbb.pdf.
65  assemblée nationale. 1995. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d’enquête sur les 
sectes, Rapporteur M. Jacques Guyard, 20 décembre 1995. Paris: assemblée nationale.





Modern-daY CruSaderS In euroPe. tradItIon, FaMILY and ProPertY:  
anaLYSIS oF a tranSnatIonaL, uLtra-ConServatIve,  
CatHoLIC-InSPIred InFLuenCe netWorK
known as a Dubia (the 25-page letter was delivered to the Pope),68 to Pope 
Francis’s Amoris Laetitia69 (a post-synodal apostolic exhortation addre-
ssing the pastoral care of families). tFP’s positioning within the Church is 
thus delicate from the start: tFP is loyal to the vatican but exerts conserva-
tive pressure on it and is allied to some of the more conservative elements 
in the Church hierarchy, particularly at times when the leadership is seen 
as progressive. 
Massimo Introvigne (2009)70 analyses tFP and the Heralds of the 
Gospel from the perspective of religious economy. recalling religious 
economic theory, where a market for religion exists and there may be 
competition both inter-brand (different religions) and intra-brand (diffe-
rent movements within a same religion) for religious consumers, Intro-
vigne explains how tFP catered to the ’strict’ or ’ultra-strict’ Catholic reli-
gious market from the movement’s founding until the founder’s passing. 
tFP and, later, the Heralds of the Gospel would appear to have shifted 
towards the ’strict’ (for tFP) to ’moderate conservative’ (for the Heralds 
of the Gospel) markets for a number of reasons, among them intra-brand 
competition with the SSPX and because the potential markets for the 
’strict’ to ’moderate conservative’ religious consumers are far larger than 
the ’ultra-strict’ market. Introvigne also explains why organizations emana-
ting from the tFP movement display their proximity to the movement 
differently: “the fact that the Heralds of the Gospel, whose leadership is 
largely composed of former prominent tFP members, downplay their rela-
tionship with Corrêa de oliveira allows a number of Brazilian bishops to 
support them without either revisiting the history of the nCBB.” (Intro-
vigne 2009, 7). the ambiguity in how openly tFP organizations associate 





70  Massimo Introvigne is involved in several tFP-related organizations, including the 
Italian alleanza Cattolica (https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/people/massimo-intro-
vigne), and founder of the Centre Studi Storici sulla Contro-rivoluzione (CeSCor: Cescor.
org) dedicated to the writings of Plinio Côrrea de oliveira. Introvigne is also the founder of 





6. tFP cult accusations and legal troubles
From the afterlife, Plinio Correa de Oliveira, while sitting 
next to the Virgin Mary in the sky, is also regulating climate 
change and working in favor of Pope Francis’ imminent death. 
(Fsspx.news 2017)
no understanding of the tFP network is complete without also becoming 
familiar with its history of legal troubles and accusations it faced. the 
accusations against tFP fall into three categories: 1) indoctrination of chil-
dren; 2) political extremism and 3) cult allegations. 
6.1. Indoctrination of children 
tFP organizations’ focus on youth has taken various forms, including 
summer camps as well as permanent educational institutions. early in 
its history, in 1977, tFP organizations established a school in France. 
Following several complaints, the French Catholic Church investigated 
the complaints (La depèche. 2003) which resulted in closing the school 
in 1979 when authorities concluded that the school served as a centre for 
recruitment and indoctrination. Indeed, the tribunal which judged the 
case stated the management of the establishment, almost all Brazilian nati-
onals, exerted psychological pressure on the young people inciting them to… 
become adepts of a certain foreign organisation… (Leroy 1980). In return, 
the French tFP organizations launched a vigorous defence of their move-
ment in 1980 (tFP-France 1980).
a few years later, in venezuela, family members of young people 
involved in the local tFP organization filed a complaint with authorities, 
claiming that the organization created a conflict between parents and chil-
dren, with the subsequent removal of the child or children (minors or adults) 
from their respective homes… that the aforementioned family conflicts have 
their cause or are induced through mental control techniques… whose ideo-
logy is related to the Brazilian Society of Defense of the Tradition, Family 
and Property (venezuela Ministerio Público 1984). these allegations 
resulted in a police raid on the offices of resistencia in october 1984 as 
well as a parliamentary investigation, generating wide media coverage.71 
the result was the expulsion of the organization when the Ministry for the 
Interior and justice considered that tFP’s activities were contrary to the 
Constitution (Calcano de temeltas 1999) and “once it was proven that the 
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organization offended family values by instilling discriminatory values, 
turning youths into fanatics” (Cesnur.org. 2001)
6.2. Political extremism
during the investigation in venezuela a number of concerns arose regar-
ding tFP related to the use of violence. among the most serious concerns 
were that tFP devotees were allegedly involved in a plot to assassinate 
the Pope in 1984 while on a Pontifical visit to venezuela which reportedly 
contributed to the expulsion of the tFP order from the country (navarro 
2004). However, in april 1984, the Chilean tFP member organization itself 
reports having been the victim of an attempted bombing of its headquar-
ters in Santiago.72 Without delving into the credibility of these allegations, 
the Immigration and refugee Board of Canada did list tFP as a ’religious 
para-military group’ in 1998 (Immigration and refugee Board of Canada. 
1998), while tFP is classified as ’tFP and other violent groups’ in the work 
of Gonzalez ruiz on the far-right Mexican youth movement Muro (see 
next paragraphs for more on Muro).73 
More recently, starting in 2011 and persisting today, the Spanish orga-
nization Hazte Oir has been the subject of a range of different accusa-
tions that it is the Spanish front of a far-right, ultra-Catholic, para-mili-
tary, secret society from Mexico called el Yunque (’the anvil’) (el Plural. 
2017; Mata 2015). victoria uroz Martínez, the wife of one of the alleged 
leaders of el Yunque in Spain, in an extensive interview in january 2015, 
describes her experiences of el Yunque and states that el Yunque uses 
tFP as a base to reach other countries.74 to understand the links between 
the tFP network and el Yunque, it is necessary to delve into the history of 
far-right movements in Latin america. Irene ortiz (2008) explains how a 
violent, far-right youth group in Mexico, the Movimiento universitario de 
renovadora orientación (Muro), which emerged in the 1960s was a key 
contributing ingredient in what became el Yunque (ortiz 2008). Sepa-
rately, Gonzalez ruiz (2006) explains how the Brazilian tFP maintained 
links with Mexican far-right groups, including Muro, in the 1970s. the 
allegations that Hazte oir is linked with el Yunque reached mainstream 
media and prompted the head of Hazte oir to file a lawsuit for defama-
72  Catolicismo. 1984. “atentado contra sede da tFP chilena.” Catolicismo 34(400), april, 
page 12. http://www.pliniocorreadeoliveira.info/GeS_19840314_Chileatentadoasede.htm. 
73  Gonzalez ruiz, Édgar. undated. MURO (Movimiento Universitario de Renovadora Orient-
ación) Memorias y Testimonios 1961–2002. Puebla: Benemérita universidad autónoma de 
Puebla. 





tion. In 2014, Hazte oir lost the lawsuit, with the judge affirming that the 
allegations were “essentially true” (jimenez/juan 2015), resulting in some 
Spanish Catholic Bishops prohibiting Hazte oir use of their facilities in 
2015 (Bastante 2015).
Finally, tFP is also the subject of fanciful conspiracy theories, chief 
among them from uS fringe politician from the 1980s and 1990s, Lyndon 
Larouche,75 who accused the tFP of being the nexus of a vast network of 
aristocrats who were plotting to take over the world and assassinate his 
wife.76 
6.3. Cult allegations
there have been persistent allegations directed at tFP that it is a ’cult’ 
centring around two main concerns; on the one hand, there is suspicion 
from public authorities regarding possible harm to tFP members and the 
public at large and, on the other, accusations from ecclesiastical authori-
ties about tFP’s alleged doctrinal deviations. 
authorities in France were among the most proactive in investigating 
the former. In 1995 and 1999, the French national assembly (assemblée 
nationale. 1995) listed French tFP members among its list of cult-like 
movements, as did a public body in charge of monitoring cult activities 
in 2006.77 the 2006 report to the Prime Minister’s office by the ’Inter-
ministerial mission for vigilance and fight against cult-like movements’ 
describes the tFP affiliates as dedicated to fundraising for unspecified objec-
tives78 and having characteristics which are considered warning bells for 
cult-like behaviour, such as: increasing demands on persons involved in 
the campaigns; opacity of the hierarchy and structure; a high degree of 
hierarchy and the involvement of only a few key persons in the manage-
ment; and distortion between the stated aims of a campaign and the even-
tual use of funds.79
From ecclesiastical authorities, in addition to the formal accusations 
of the nBCC of 1985 (see section 6), new accusations emerged in june 
2017 of cult-like worship of dr. Plinio and his mother, Lucilia. the leader 
75  For more about Lyndon Larouche, see Severo (2019). 
76  eIr. 1985. “For an international mobilization to stop the tFP brainwashing cult.” EIR 
12(5), 5 February. 
77  MIvILude (2006) and tribunal Correctionnel de Chartres. 2001. “tradition, Famille et 
Propriété, avenir de la culture, Groupe inscrit sur la liste des sectes du rapport parlementaire 
de 1995, Procès ’européenne de medias’ (GeIe) contre ’L’echo républicain de Chartres’.” Echo 
communication, audience of 17 September 2001. 
78  MIvILudeS. 2006. page 93.
79  Ibid., page 3. 
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of the Heralds of the Gospel (see section 4.3) was placed under investiga-
tion by the Holy See’s Congregation for Institutes of Consecrated Life in 
june 2017, when a series of videos featured him conducting religious cere-
monies dedicated to dr. Plinio and his mother and claiming that “climate 
change, and the increase of heat. It is Plinio who does everything.”80 they 
are also under investigation for asserting that the current Pope is under the 
control of the devil and that he would soon die, as well as for using non-
vatican-approved methods of exorcism. (Palmer 2017) 
at a more personal level, blogs abound of ex-tFP and Heralds of the 
Gospel followers claiming to have escaped from the grips of what, accor-
ding to them, is a cult-like movement.81 However, in 2008 the French gover-
nment clarified that tFP has never been the subject of judicial proceedings 
and cannot be described as sectarian aberrations constituting acts liable 
to be penalized,82 while the vatican investigation into the Heralds of the 
Gospel was still ongoing in 2019. 
7. tFP’s influence on Srr in europe today
even though tFP has not often been recognised in europe, it plays a 
leading role among the anti-gender landscape of movements and organi-
sations (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017) and the anti-Srr advocacy networks 
such as agenda europe (datta 2018). tFP’s influence on Srr takes three 
main routes: social mobilization; norm entrepreneur; and infiltrating deci-
sion-making spaces.
7.1. Social mobilization
tFP social mobilization campaigns always have multiple targets: aiming at 
the general public, the political classes and the Catholic Church to main-
tain a socially conservative line, as well as other Catholics to rally them to 
tFP ideals and, when possible, also serve a fundraising objective. a recent 
example is a rosary reading and prayer event to mark the centenary of the 
miracle of Fatima and expiation of the sins of abortion, same-sex marriage 
and euthanasia in Belgium in front of the Palace of justice in Brussels in 
october 2016.83 In the netherlands, the main protagonists in defending 
the ’Zwarte Piet’ tradition (a helper for Saint nicolas who is painted in 
80  Ibid.
81  For example, see: https://tfpheraldos.blogspot.be/; http://trescarabelasaladeriva.blog-
spot.be; and http://www.angelusonline.org/index.php?section=articles&subsection=show
_article&article_id=773. 
82  assemblée nationale. 2008. Journal Officiel, 10 june, Question n°: 24712, page 4832. 




black-face and assists delivering candy to children on Saint-nicolas day 
in Belgium and the netherlands) in 2017 and 2018 was the dutch tFP 
members Cultuur onder vuur.84 In Lithuania, the tFP Member, Krikščio-
niškos Kultūros Institutas has led the charge against holding Baltic Pride 
in vilnius in 2019 (repeckaite 2019). the creation in 2017 of tFP Student 
action europe with street protests in estonia, Ireland and the nether-
lands suggest that the network is taking the example of the uS-based tFP 
Student action to the streets and campuses of europe.85 
7.2. norm entrepreneur
From a protest movement, tFP has evolved into a norm entrepreneur 
through three approaches: agenda setting, policy expertise and finally 
engaging in ’law-fare’. First, tFP affiliates convene events to allow for soci-
ally conservative agenda-setting. these attract high-level participation – 
for example in Croatia with ’tradfest’. ’tradFest’ takes place annually in 
Zagreb since 2016 and brings together the conservative representatives of 
the Church, such as Cardinal raymond Leo Burke,86 with leading politi-
cians such as davor Ivo Stier, the deputy Prime Minister of Croatia; alek-
sander Stepkowski, former deputy Minister of Foreign affairs in Poland 
(also President of ordo Iuris Poland); and uS Member of Congress Chris 
Smith,87 as well as tFP representatives such as from Poland and Croatia.88 
Similar events take place at the tFP eu headquarters in Brussels where 
practically all the conservative currents active in European institutions 
participate in our events; both the elite of the very cosmopolitan society of 
Brussels today, and the high Belgian nobility.89 these events in turn serve 
a related purpose to favor the formation of conservative coalition networks 
in several areas: right to life, family, religious values etc90 as per tFP’s accre-
dited representative to the eu Institutions. 
as second tool in tFP’s norm-setting repertoire is that of developing 
policy and legislative campaigns. echoing the tFP of the 1970’s and 80’s, 
84  https://cultuurondervuur.nu/tag/zwarte-piet/ 
85  https://tfpstudentactioneurope.org/ 
86  For more on Cardinal Burke’s conservative positioning within the vatican (Feder and 
Hall 2014).
87  Congressman Chris Smith is a leading anti-Srr voice in the uS Congress. See his record: 
http://www.ontheissues.org/nj/Christopher_Smith_abortion.htm.
88  http://www.tradfest.org/en/tradfest-2016-en and http://www.tradfest.org/en/tradfest-
2017-en/. 
89  Interview with Paul, duke of oldenburg, 10 May 2012: http://www.nobility.org/2012/05/10/
interview-oldenburg. 
90  Ibid. 
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the campaigns are aimed at the public defamation of progressive, left-wing 
governments (see examples of France and Spain in section 4.1). Hazte oir 
updated the tFP-Covadonga work with a similar publication in 2010 enti-
tled Proyecto Zapatero: Cronica de un asalto a la sociedad.91 In Proyecto 
Zapatero, Hazte oir explains how secularism, relativism and gender 
ideology comprise the key ingredients of a grand social engineering expe- 
riment by the Socialist Party resulting in undermining the Spanish State. 
the Hazte oir President then went on a book tour to promote Proyecto 
Zapatero and was hosted by the tFP headquarters for its Brussels launch92 
and by the tFP successor organization in Chile.93
the more advanced organisations have evolved to acquire the legal 
expertise to develop specific policy asks such as proposals to restrict abor-
tion in Poland and Spain. the draft legislation in Poland was prepared 
and defended by ordo Iuris94 and inspired by Hazte oir’s ’aborto Cero’ 
campaign in the case of Spain. However, after mass demonstrations in 
each country, both bills were subsequently withdrawn by their respective 
governments (BBC 2014, domonoske 2016).
Most recently, tFP members have embarked upon weakening protec-
tions for gender-based violence by campaigning against the Council of 
europe Istanbul Convention on gender-based violence.95 ordo Iuris has 
also drafted an alternative to the Istanbul Convention, the Convention on 
the rights of the Family,96 which it launched in the european Parliament 
in october 2018 and is supported by tFP affiliates from eastern europe. 
Separately, in Madrid, Hazte oir launched its bus against “Feminazis” in 
March 2019, calling for a review of Spain’s gender based violence law.97 
ordo Iuris is also an active participant in the informal anti-Srr advocacy 
network which emerged in 2013 entitled agenda europe, even hosting the 
agenda europe summit in Warsaw in 2016 (datta, 2018). agenda europe 
Summits would allow other similarly conservative minded organisations 
91  arsuaga rato, Ignacio, and Miguel vidal Santos. 2010. “Proyecto Zapatero: Cronica de 
un asalto a la sociedad.” Hazteoir website.
92  http://www.hazteoir.org/evento/390 arsuaga rato, Ignacio, and Miguel vidal Santos. 
2010. “Proyecto Zapatero: Cronica de un asalto a la sociedad.” Hazteoir website.74-muevete-
chile-invita-ignacio-arsuaga-hablar-ho-y-proyecto-zapatero.
93  Ibid.
94  See dossier Równa ochrona prawna dla każdego dziecka zarówno przed, jak i po 
urodzeniu: http://www.ordoiuris.pl/sites/default/files/pliki/oI%20broszura%20Stop%20a
borcji_final_rozkladowki.pdf.
95  https://ordoiuris.pl/pliki/dokumenty/opinia-Łotwa.pdf. 
96  http://en.ordoiuris.pl/family-and-marriage/convention-rights-family-international-guar-
antee-defence-families 
97  el Pais. 2019. Spanish ultraconservative group launches bus campaign against “femi-




and individuals outside the tFP network to learn from tFP’s policy inno-
vations and domesticate them to their context.98 
a most sophisticated level of engagement is that of initiating ’law-
fare’ (Yamin, et. al. 2018), namely using legal strategies such as litigation 
and engaging with human rights bodies at national, european and inter-
national level. thus, in February 2017, ordo Iuris obtained Consultative 
Status with the united nations (un eCoSoC. 2017) and by May 2017 had 
registered an office in the eu district of Brussels.99 the newly created ordo 
Iuris-Croatia had already secured a place on the working group with the 
Croatian government tasked with implementing the Council of europe 
Istanbul Convention on gender-based violence in 2017 (despot 2017). In 
Poland, ordo Iuris has been active before the Polish courts end expanded 
internationally by successfully supporting the case of a norwegian national 
obtaining asylum in Poland to escape the influence of the Child Protec-
tion Services.100 
7.3. Infiltrating decision-making spaces
Infiltrating decision-making spaces is another objective of tFP-affiliates 
with historical precedents in Latin america101 and contemporary exam-
ples in europe. For example, roberto de Mattei, who considers himself a 
disciple of Professor Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira… and to whom he dedicated 
a biography,102 was appointed International affairs Counsel in the gover-
nment of Silvio Berlusconi from 2002 to 2006. another example is Massimo 
Introvigne, who leads one of the tFP groups in Italy, is a student of the 
tFP founder103 and was appointed in 2011 as Personal representative of 
the oSCe Chairperson-in-office on Combating racism, Xenophobia and 
discrimination, also Focusing on Intolerance and discrimination against 
Christians and Members of other religions.104 using the credibility of this 
position, Introvigne asserted that [t]he most dangerous areas [of intole-
98  For example, ordo Iuris mentions having presented its Convention on the rights of the 
Family at the 2018 agenda europe Summit in vienna, see http://en.ordoiuris.pl/family-and-
marriage/convention-rights-family-international-guarantee-defence-families 
99  See the ordo Iuris Brussels office: http://www.ordoiuris.pl/en/node/98. 
100  http://en.ordoiuris.pl/family-and-marriage/asylum-silje-garmo-officially-confirmed. 
101  Gonzalez ruiz (2006) who explains how, in the 1970s, a tFP member from argentina 
served as his country’s ambassador to Brazil and the united nations and how another Peru-
vian tFP member rose to the position of vice-Chancellor and First vice-President under 
President Fujimori. 
102  http://www.robertodemattei.it/en.
103  http://www.massimointrovigne.com. 
104  9 Colonne. 2011. “oSCe, Massimo Introvigne nuovo rappresentante lotta al razzismo”. 
9 Colonne, 10 january.
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rance and discrimination] are those which limit the conscientious objection 
of Christians who do not want to cooperate in abortion, the sale of abortifa-
cient pills, or the celebration of same-sex marriage. (White 2013a).
Having barely established themselves in Croatia, the tFP organizations 
have already progressed significantly, with a member of the tFP organi-
zation serving as foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister until 2016.105 
More recently, in the Polish government of Prime Minister Szydlow in 
2015, aleksander Stepkowski, President of ordo Iuris Poland, was appo-
inted deputy Minister of Foreign affairs.106 Stepkowski held this function 
from 2015 to 2016, during which time he paved the way for the draft abor-
tion ban to make its way through the wheels of government. In February 
2019 Stepkowski was confirmed as a judge on the Polish Supreme Court 
(jałoszewski 2019).
Separately, an additional manner to reach influential positions is to 
court like-minded political parties or, when necessary, to create them. thus, 
the far-right parties of Lithuania (Pro Patria)107 and Belarus (Беларускі 
Народны Фронт / Belarus Peoples’ Front)108 have open links with tFP, 
while the new voX party of Spain shares an overlapping leadership with 
Hazte oir (Bastante 2018) and the a candidate for the 2019 federal elec-
tions of the Belgian vlams Belang has participated in tFP Summer acade-
mies in Poland (see section 4). 
7.4. tFP’s chequered past is catching up 
Finally, tFP’s past seems to be catching up with it. the recent success and 
notoriety that some in the tFP franchise have achieved, particularly vigi-
lare and ordo Iuris, have attracted the attention of investigative journa-
lists. In Poland, Wyborcza published several accounts in 2017 of ordo Iuris, 
outlining how it is related to “a Brazilian cult” (Piątek 2017). this gene-
rated a media spotlight on the organization and the influence it wielded 
on the ruling PiS party (Gruca 2017). Meanwhile, in Croatia, in May 2017, 
investigative journalists published articles describing the Croatian tFP 
organizations’ previously unknown links with tFP (despot 2017). on 
further investigation, journalists uncovered how the individuals involved 




107  http://www.propatria.lt/2018/12/dovilas-petkus-ko-mes-dar-nesupratome.html 
retrieved 16 March 2019.
108  http://narodny.org/ retrieved 16 March 2019 and Szoszyn, rusłan. 2016. “Polak-katolik” 




in vigilare are part of a wider anti-Semitic, ’alt-right’ community (Benačić 
2017). this revelation led to a loss of credibility for a prominent member 
of vigilare, forcing him to halt all public engagement by deleting his social 
media accounts and resigning as a regular commentator on Croatian tele-
vision (Šimićević 2017). even the religious wing of tFP, the Heralds of the 
Gospel, which had mended its relationship with the vatican, is in turmoil, 
as revelations appeared in june 2017 of inappropriate religious practices 
and threats to the life of Pope, thus provoking an internal investigation for 
apostasy by vatican bodies (tornielli 2017).
8. Conclusion
Then the great leaders of human masses rose up and began 
to drag behind them the multitudes terrorized into a state of 
delirium, and to promise simple solutions through the most 
diverse legislative reforms.
Plinio Corrêa de oliveira
Section on dictatorships, In Defense of Catholic Action, 
1943 (Corrêa de oliveira 1943)
there are several conclusions to draw from an understanding of tFP. the 
first is that tFP’s chameleon nature has successfully shielded it from public 
scrutiny in europe for a long time. this is changing as more investiga-
tive journalists, activists and researchers attempt to understand the orga-
nisations behind a number of anti-Srr policy initiatives in europe. as 
these investigations take place, it becomes apparent that story tFP did 
not end with the death of the founder and the creation of the Heralds of 
the Gospel. 
the second conclusion is that the story of tFP is now a european story. 
after a lull in the early 21st century, the tFP network has emerged from 
slumber, modernized and expanded to new territories. Indeed, the move-
ment has transformed itself and has found new horizons in europe, with 
recent progress in Poland, Croatia and estonia. It has also updated its infra-
structure by setting up an office to lobby the eu, an institute of higher lear-
ning in France, as well as a team of lawyers based in Poland. In its original 
Brazil tFP is but a shadow of what it once was… with valuable assets such 
as land and some real estate, as well as a structured mailing services that 
distributes medals and collects donations, the entity has lost relevance and 
is no longer a reference in Brazil’s conservative agenda (IStoe 2013). In 
some parts of europe tFP affiliated organisations are now the centre of 
gravity in pushing positions which go against Srr.
tFP’s position within the Catholic world also merits attention. When the 
Church hierarchy was sufficiently conservative, its role as an insurrection 
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movement tempered. now, under the progressive reign of Pope Frances, 
tFP’s traditionalist oriented critiques are resurfacing and they are finding 
allies with like-minded factions within the Church. this suggest that there 
is also competition with other, more mainstream vatican-oriented, soci-
ally conservative movements for agenda setting against Srr. 
the tFP network possesses a recognizable toolkit to achieve its objec-
tives. the chief among them is public mobilization involving religious 
campaigns through mass communications. another component is that 
of setting the political debate by developing legislative packages and of 
demonizing progressive governments. this legislative experience has 
culminated in the creation of permanent legal expertise which is enga-
ging is in ’lawfare’ at national as well as international level. a standard in 
the tFP repertoire is leadership infiltration, with several tFP-affiliated 
individuals gaining access to influential political positions. 
the current populist, reactionary and nationalist trend in europe, often 
intertwined in religious discourse, offers fertile ground and familiar terri-
tory for tFP franchises to take their crusade further, cultivate new allies 
and, thus, have greater impact. More ominous is the depth of infiltration 
by Ordo Iuris into the workings of the Polish State, with the current hard-
right, ethno-nationalist government’s embrace chillingly reminiscent of 
tFP’s glory days with Latin american fascist regimes. Finally, tFP’s reac-
tionary narrative espousing religious orthodoxy and sanctifying economic 
inequality by invoking a heroic and noble imaginary past could become 
attractive to some by offering religious legitimization for illiberalism and 
authoritarianism, as it did in Latin america in the 1960s to 1990s. alter-
natively, understanding tFP’s origins and history through time and across 
continents and the movement’s contempt for women and the poor, the exto-
lling of wealth as part of its ideology (Gruca 2007) could prove to be the 
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Sažetak
Suvremeni križari u europi.  
tradicija, obitelj i vlasništvo: analiza transnacionalnih,  
ultrakonzervativnih, katolicizmom  
inspiriranih mreža utjecaja
tri nedavna događaja koja se tiču seksualnih i reproduktivnih prava (predlo-
žena zabrana pobačaja u Poljskoj, blokiranje potpore inicijativi She Decides u 
Hrvatskoj i zaustavljanje Zakona o civilnom partnerstvu u estoniji) potaknu-
le su organizacije koje se doimaju poput nacionalne antene transnacionalne, 
socijalno konzervativne mreže tradicija, obitelj i vlasništvo (tradition, Fami-
ly and Property – tFP). tFP je oznaka za skup međupovezanih konzervativnih 
i katolicizmom nadahnutih organizacija koje dijele svjetonazor blizak osniva-
ču tFP-a Plinia Corrêe de oliveira. nastao u Brazilu 1960-ih, a zatim proširen 
svijetom, tFP je već dugo pobunjenički pokret unutar katolicizma, a kojeg od-
likuje specifičan način djelovanja kroz spajanje socijalnog konzervativizma, 
ekonomskog hiperliberalizma i naslijeđe bliskosti s krajnje desnim pokreti-
ma. oslabljen u Latinskoj americi, tFP je sada aktivna europska mreža s do-
minantnim stavovima protiv seksualnih i reproduktivnih prava (Srr). utjecaj 
tFP-a na seksualna i reproduktivna prava zbiva se putem društvene mobiliza-
cije, normativnog poduzetništva i ulaska u prostore donošenja odluka. tFP-u 
su se u Istočnoj europi otvorili novi horizonti i ambicije za utjecaj na europ-
sku uniju i ujedinjene narode. reakcionarni narativ tFP-a, koji promiče pravo-
vjernost i posvećuje ekonomske nejednakosti, mogao bi postati privlačan kao 
religijska legitimacija iliberalizma i autoritarizma.
Ključne riječi: reproduktivna prava, ultrakonzervativizam, religijski pokreti.
